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AbstrAct
One explanation for the observed lack of economic dynamism in Europe is that so-called zom-
bie firms are spreading and that they crowd out the growth of other, potentially more "lively",
companies. Zombie firms are firms that apparently are unable to repay their debt and yet, they
continue operating. the report describes estimates for 2010 and 2013 of the incidence of zom-
bie firms across 19 European countries using firm-level data for more than one million compa-
nies. Importantly, it uses three alternative definitions of what constitutes a zombie firm to en-
sure robustness of estimates. The report finds that zombie firms are spreading in Europe, with
the estimated incidence for 2013 being higher than for 2010. It also identifies considerable
differences across countries. Zombie firm shares as of overall corporate capital are particularly
high in Greece and Spain, but low in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Distinguishing 
among firms in terms of size and age, the report finds that larger and older firms, as compared 
to rela-tively smaller and younger firms, are more likely to be zombie firms. The report also 
finds that the growth of zombie firms in terms of employment crowds out the growth of other, 
non-zom-bie firms, especially young ones. Thus, one policy implication is that, greater 
economic activi-ty is achieved by allowing zombie firms to exit the market.
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1. introduction
Zombie firms tend to have detrimental effects on their healthy peers. In the corporate sector, zombie firms are firms that are not reporting any profits 
(net of interest paid) for an extensive period of time, and 
yet manage to continue operating. Such firms, if financial 
textbook suggestions were literally applied, would be 
considered "distressed" and candidates for liquidation. 
But in practice, they are rarely liquidated. Moreover, their 
continued existence may create some negative externali-
ties for the remaining healthy corporate sector in that the 
former crowd out the growth of other, non-zombie, firms.
the present report provides estimates of the incidence 
of zombie firms in Europe and analyses the potential ef-
fects of the presence of such zombie firms on other firms 
in the same country and sector. The report follows Adalet 
McGowan et al.[1] and bank of Korea[2], although it goes 
beyond these studies in that it considers several alternative 
definitions of zombie firms to ensure robustness of esti-
mation results. In particular, it considers three alternative 
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definitions. First, firms with a coverage ratio (operational
earnings, that is, earnings after depreciation over interest
payments) below one during three consecutive years,
regardless of the age of the firm. Second, mature firms,
defined as firms ten years or older, with a coverage ratio
below one during three consecutive years. Third, mature
firms with a coverage ratio below one during five consec-
utive years. Young firms, defined as firms that are nine
years old or younger, are excluded in the latter two defini-
tions as the lack of profits might be a temporary (and nat-
ural) feature of such firms. In fact, firms often incur losses
in the first years of their life for extended periods of time
because they must invest until they reach sufficient op-
erating capacities and customer bases, which then allows
them to eventually report profits. All three definitions aim
to capture indebted companies whose debt servicing eats
up their profits during a considerable stretch of time and
yet continue to operate; perhaps because the firm is being
kept alive "artificially" by its lenders?
Our main empirical results are as follows:
a. The share of zombie firms is larger among larger and
older firms, thus confirming the results by  Adalet Mc-
Gowan et al.[1]. The latter authors consider the first of the
three definitions considered here, according to which even
young firms can be identified as zombie firms. Using that
definition, we find that about 3% of 3 to 6-year-old firms
are zombies, versus 7% in the case of firms that are be-
tween 21 and 40 years old. For large firms with more than
250 employees, the share is nearly 6%, while it is less
than 4% for firms with 5-9-employee firms.
b. Zombie firms are spreading: there is an increase
between 2010 and 2013 in the share of zombie firms in
Europe and in particular in Greece, Spain, and Portugal.
Ireland is characterised by a high share as well, although it
is decreasing. Slovenia, Belgium and Sweden have com-
paratively lower shares of zombie companies and Hunga-
ry and Bulgaria have the lowest shares among the sample
countries.
c. Zombie firms are crowding out the growth of
non-zombie firms. To assess the potential interaction be-
tween zombies and non-zombies, we construct a measure
for zombie congestion by calculating the share of sunk
capital by country and sector. We find that the share of
zombies affects non-zombies. In particular, the larger the
share of zombie firms is, the less non-zombie firms are
likely to grow, although they seem to become more pro-
ductive to overcome the constraints they seem to be fac-
ing. Zombie firms thus create a "congestion". Focusing
on young non-zombie firms, we find that they are more
strongly affected by the "zombie congestion" than older
non-zombies are. These findings are in line with Adalet
McGowan et al.[1] and they suggest that greater incidence 
of zombie firms tends to hamper the growth of young and 
potentially fast-growing firms. As regards the future of 
zombie firms, we find that smaller and younger zombies 
stand a greater chance of becoming "alive" again and 
report positive operating profits compared to larger and 
older firms.
d. Zombie firms fairly rarely turn healthy again, es-
pecially when they are old. We find that close to 90% of 
zombie firms remain zombies or exit the market in the 
next two years after they were identified as zombies, by 
any of the three zombie definitions. 
The report is organized as follows. The next section 
discusses selected previous studies and provides some 
theoretical background. section 3 describes the data used 
for the empirical analysis. section 4 reports the results of 
the analysis of the incidence of zombie firms distinguish-
ing between countries, firm age and firm size. Section 5 
reports the results from estimates of multivariate mod-
els assessing the effects of the existence of zombie on 
non-zombie firms. The final section concludes and raises 
questions that could be addressed in follow-up work.
2. Related Literature
Takeo Hoshi highlighted the issue of zombie firms in 
Japan in a series of contributions, including Hoshi[3]. He 
observes that a large share of Japanese firms was under 
financial distress but could still continue to operate. His 
analysis focuses on the interest paid by Japanese firms in 
the 1990s at the level of the individual firm, which he then 
compares with an estimate of what should be the lowest 
payable rate – as derived from the term structure of (gov-
ernment bond) risk-free rates, taking into account the debt 
maturity structure of the firm under consideration. the 
analysis reveals that a large share of firms made interest 
payments that were lower than the minimum estimates. 
Also, those firms that made such "abnormally" low inter-
est rate payments were firms that were performing rather 
poorly, which seems at odds with such low rates being 
charged. These observations can however be reconciled 
by assuming that banks were financially supporting these 
firms by lowering nominal interest rates to effectively 
provide a form of debt forgiveness. Hoshi[3] argues banks 
were subsidizing firms. While such a strategy to refinance 
loans in the expectation to obtain repayment in the future 
might in principle be more profitable for the bank than 
plainly reducing the reported value of the loan through 
asset liquidation, such practises were concentrated in par-
ticularly weak corporate sectors with little upside risk. In 
fact, such practises were concentrated in sectors less sub-
ject to international competition such as services and con-
struction. this observation casts doubts on the ultimate 
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rationale on the part of the banks for keeping the firms 
artificially further alive as an eventual improvement in the 
debtor situation appears unlikely.
Peek and rosengren[4] argue that banking regulation 
is part of the mechanics behind the zombie phenomenon. 
Using a sample of loans extended to Japanese listed firms 
during the Japanese 1990s recession, the authors find that 
banks with capital ratios close to regulatory thresholds 
were more likely to refinance loans to weakly performing 
companies at unusually low interest rates than were banks 
with stronger capital ratios. The authors refer to the phe-
nomenon as bank forbearance, whereby banks rollover 
debt in order to avoid having to report losses, which in 
turn might trigger costly regulatory recapitalization. this 
phenomenon is often considered to be a main factor ex-
plaining the Japanese economic stagnation of the 1990's, 
i.e. the growing incidence of so-called zombie firms.
caballero et al.[5] go beyond the analysis of the inci-
dence of zombie firms and investigate theoretically and 
empirically the effects of the incidence of zombie on 
non-zombie firms. Following Peek and Rosengren[4], the 
former authors assume that banks, in order to maintain 
required regulatory capital ratios, opt to support existing 
borrowers in economic downturns. Unproductive zombie 
firms are therefore subsidised through abnormally low in-
terest rates because banks are unwilling to book loan loss-
es. Healthy and productive non-zombie firms must com-
pete against zombie firms on loanable amounts. Banks' 
subsidies to zombies distort competition in credit markets 
in favour of the latter; this adds on financial constraints 
to healthy non-zombies and slows down their growth. 
Moreover, zombies are likely to distort prices in product 
and labour markets as a result of the subsidies, as zom-
bies are likely to gamble for their survival. As a result of 
the fierce competition from zombies, incumbent healthy 
non-zombie firms must retrench from relatively less pro-
ductive projects and instead renew or select more produc-
tive projects. As a result, the growth of non-zombie firms 
is adversely affected, while their measured productivity 
increases. the authors construct a measure of interest gap 
similar to Hoshi [3], that is the difference between an esti-
mate of the interest rate a firm does pay in practise and the 
estimated lowest possible market interest rate that it might 
secure in theory (if it managed to finance itself at the rates 
applicable to government borrowing). Negative values 
of that measure are taken as an indication that the firm 
is subsidised by the bank (zombie firm) ① . the authors 
show that the share of total assets held by zombie firms 
in Japan grew from about 2% in the early 1980s to about 
12% in 2002. Zombie firms have hindered the growth of 
non-zombie firms. Among different sectors, construction 
was most severely affected with a share of assets held by 
zombie firms that attained 30% in 2001. 
Adalet McGowan et al.[1] conduct a somewhat similar 
empirical analysis for selected OECD countries, although 
the latter authors consider an alternative definition of zom-
bie firms. Their suggested definition is that zombie firms 
are ten years or older and are reporting coverage ratios be-
low one in three consecutive years, where coverage ratio 
is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax payments 
but after depreciation (EBIT) to interest payments. The 
coverage ratio is a standard measure for assessing loan 
repayment capacity and is widely used by credit analysts. 
Repeated records of the coverage ratio falling below one 
are seen as indicating serious financial difficulties. the 
authors show that the share of zombie companies varies 
substantially across the 13 sample countries. they com-
pute the share of total capital (fixed assets) held by zom-
bie firms, which they call sunk capital. In their sample, 
sunk capital ranges in 2013 from 4% in Slovenia to 15% 
in Spain and almost 20% in Italy. This estimate suggests 
that the empirical relevance of the zombie firm phenom-
enon can be considerable in practise for countries other 
than Japan during the 1990s. 
That the phenomenon of zombie firms can be practical-
ly relevant in Europe is also suggested by Acharya et al.[6]. 
The authors study the effects of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), which was launched in 2012. The program 
is interpreted by the authors as an indirect subsidisation 
of European banks that substantial amounts of sovereign 
bonds issued by European periphery countries. the au-
thors find that banks that thus benefited from the program 
increased their overall loan supply, but that this supply 
was mostly targeted towards low-quality firms with 
pre-existing lending relationships with these banks. Loans 
to unproductive firms increased in the period shortly after 
the start of the OMT program in particular in Italy, Spain 
and Portugal. Following Caballero et al.[5], the authors 
show that banks extended loans to borrowers at interest 
rates that were below those paid by the most creditworthy 
European sovereign borrowers. Moreover, non-zombie 
firms suffered from the presence of zombie firms. Ac-
cording to the authors, both investment and employment 
growth rates of non-zombie firms were significantly lower 
if the fraction of zombie firms in their respective industry 
sector increased compared to non-zombie firms that were 
active in sectors without a high incidence of zombie firms. 
This finding suggests that, in the presence of a consider-
able incidence of zombie firms, indirect subsidisation of 
banks can have undesired effects on employment and in-
vestment operating through a misallocation of loan supply. 
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Aggregate estimates for Europe can hide considerable 
cross-country differences. For example, Deutsche Bundes-
bank[7] consider firm-level microdata from the Deutsche 
bundesbank Financial statement Data Pool for German 
firms and shows that zombie firms only make up a small 
percentage of all firms in Germany and that this share 
has not increased as of recently compared to the situation 
eight years before. That said, that result is based on the 
widely used zombie company definition of a firm with 
interest rate coverage not exceeding one for three years. 
Considering an alternative definition of zombie firms that 
classifies as a zombie firm one whose cash flow has been 
negative for three consecutive years, a slight increase in 
zombie firm incidence can be observed, although at much 
lower levels than considering the more widely used defi-
nition.
3. Data
We obtain micro-level firm data from Orbis, an electron-
ic databank of corporate financial statements published 
by Moody's Bureau van Dijk. We extract unconsolidated 
accounts of all non-financial firms in both manufacturing 
and services sectors registered in European countries and 
retain firms with at least five employees and reporting 
assets in at least two years Our sample includes 19 Euro-
pean Union countries for which we have sufficient infor-
mation so to identify the incidence and share of zombie 
companies. the countries represented in our sample are 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom.
table 1 reports the number of sample firms by year 
and country. It illustrates that the number of firms covered 
varies over time and across countries. One issue in Orbis 
is a sudden increase (or drop) in the number of firms, 
which might just reflect that data from specific providers 
to Orbis is added or withdrawn. Fortunately, we do not 
observe such variations in our sample. As a general rule, 
the most recent years of data available from Orbis tends to 
contain fewer companies simply because firms may delay 
their reporting. To avoid this issue, we choose 2013 as the 
last year for our sample. The table shows that we have 
available data for only about 5,000 and a little more than 
10,000 firms for Ireland and Slovenia, respectively, while 
we have data for more than 300,000 and 250,000 firms for 
Germany and Spain, respectively. 
We consider three definitions for zombie firms and re-
fer to the firms identified by them as zombie A, zombie B, 
and zombie C, respectively (see also Table A1 in Annex A). 
a. The first definition is zombie A. It defines a firm as 
a zombie firm, any firm – regardless of age – with a cov-
erage ratio equal to one or less during three years, where 
the coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of operational 
earnings (EBIT, earnings net of depreciation) to interest 
payments. 
b. Zombie B definition restricts zombie A definition to 
ten years or older firms (again, with coverage ratios equal 
to one or less during three years). 
c. Zombie C definition further restricts zombie B defi-
nition to firms with a coverage ratio below one during five 
consecutive years – instead of three as in the other defini-
tions.
Each of the three definitions of zombie firms requires 
that firms report at least three consecutive years of cov-
erage ratio. This constraint limits the extent to which we 
are able to produce estimates for different points in time 
for the given sample. As regards zombie A and zombie b 
definitions, data for the three years from 2008 to 2010 are 
considered to obtain estimates of zombie firm incidence in 
2010, although such data are not available for all sample 
countries. Data from 2011 to 2013 are used to identify 
incidence of zombie firms in 2013, and these data are 
available for all sample countries. As regards zombie c 
definition, estimates are produced for year 2013 only, and 
for a subset of countries. Orbis reports corporate profits 
unevenly across countries. Typically, only 20% of firms 
report profits in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and 
belgium [8,9], which accordingly reduces the number of 
firms available in our sample in the case of these coun-
tries.
4. incidence of Zombie Firms 
4.1 Share of Zombie Firms by Age and Size
this section reports estimates for 2013 of the share of 
zombies, by age and by size in number of employees, con-
sidering all three zombie definitions. The share of zombie 
firms increases with age, although also exhibiting a slight 
U-shape at the lower end, regardless of the zombie defini-
tion we consider (Figure 1). Considering zombie B defini-
tion, the share of zombie firms among 5-9 employee firms 
is about 5.2% and drops to about 3.8% for 10-19 employ-
ee firms, representing a drop of 26%. The number then 
gradually increases up to 6.45% for larger companies (250 
employees or more); for example, the share of zombies is 
56% higher among 250+ firms than among firms with 10-
19 employees. 
The relation between age and zombies is also mono-
tonically increasing for the most part, although it slightly 
drops at the higher end, that is considering firms with 41 
years or older. Considering zombie A definition, which 
does not restrict companies to be at least 10 years old 
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unlike zombie b definition, young companies (2-5 years) 
display the lowest share of zombies (4.5%) while 21-40 
years old firms display the largest share (nearly 7.7%); the 
latter is considerably higher than the former (70%). The 
share of zombies then drops to 7.2% among oldest com-
panies (41+).
Figure 1. Zombie firms distribution by size and  
age category, 2013
Notes: the figures report the shares of zombie firms by category. 
the left-hand figure reports the share of zombie firms by size 
category; the right-hand figure reports the share of zombie firms 
by age category. We use three definitions of zombies.
Table 1. Number of Observations by country and Year
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Austria 36,611 37,203 37,253
bulgaria 45,771 48,471 50,952 54,203 57,077 59,127
belgium 38,643 39,557 40,608 41,481 41,667 41,769
czech republic 35,435 36,684 37,714 38,074 38,101 38,101
Finland 20,784 21,696 22,572 23,385 23,990 24,221
France 189,535 194,889 200,039 204,149 206,600 207,205
Germany 308,962 309,313 310,413
Greece 22,373 22,687 22,909 23,098 23,198 23,206
Hungary 44,917 48,139 50,324 52,311
Ireland 4,948 5,024 5,052 5,152
Italy 185,044 194,370 204,112 212,470 216,524 217,574
Poland 74,820 76,679 79,994 80,031 82,031
Portugal 77,256 79,581 81,929 84,137 86,037
romania 78,236 81,617 85,656 89,957 94,176 97,692
slovakia 20,042 20,891 21,756 22,555 22,998 23,041
slovenia 10,846 11,060 11,287 11,501 11,662 11,729
spain 234,837 239,484 244,115 248,119 251,562 252,951
Sweden 41,817 43,354 45,114 45,832 45,934 46,132
United Kingdom 40,071 41,017 41,886 42,641 43,227 43,415
tOtAL 963,434 1,147,853 1,234,845 1,618,124 1,642,776 1,654,760
Notes: Observations for firms in Orbis by country and year, for which data on total assets of firm is available.
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the patterns of zombie incidence as a function of firm 
age and size described above are consistent with Hoshi 
(2006) and Adalet McGowan et al.[1,3](Figure 4), although 
the latter estimates are higher in absolute values. For 
instance, Adalet McGowan et al. [1] find that the highest 
share of zombie in age categories is 11.5% at the higher 
end (41+). In most categories, our estimates are within 
a +/- 0.5 percentage points range compared to the esti-
mates by Adalet McGowan et al.[1], but estimates for the 
oldest firms differ considerably. As regards size in terms 
of number of employees, the overall patterns of estimates 
are similar although our point estimates are about 2-4 
percentage points smaller than those reported in Adalet 
McGowan et al.[1]. 
Thus, our results confirm that the share of zombie 
firms increases with age and size. These patterns can be 
explained in various ways. First, larger and older firms are 
least opaque: they have longer track records, provide more 
reliable financial reports, and may have established longer 
term lending relationships with banks. Such firms may 
have built a reputation as regards their ability to cope with 
temporary spells of profitless years, which might justify 
refinancing viewed from the point of the bank. Moreover, 
the sunk costs of loan restructuring and potential need for 
additional capital tend to be higher for large firms. Young 
companies are less likely to benefit from such consider-
ations. 
4.2 Share of Zombie Firms by Country
this section reports estimates of the total share of zombie 
firms by country for 2010 and 2013. Two measures are 
considered. First, we calculate the share as the ratio of the 
number of zombie firms in a country to the total number 
of firms in this country in our sample. Then we compute 
the ratio of the total amount of fixed assets (capital stock) 
held by zombie firms to the total fixed assets in the same 
country in our sample. the latter measures the so-called 
sunk capital; sunk capital is the figure we will use for the 
analysis of the spill-overs of zombie firms on non-zom-
bies. 
The results for the first measure are shown in Figure 
2. The share of zombie firms increases between 2011 and 
2013, except in Great Britain and Ireland. The jump in the 
share of zombie firms is striking in Greece, Spain, Portu-
gal, and Italy, which are countries that were particularly 
affected by the European sovereign debt crisis. Ireland, 
which was affected by the global financial crisis, but less 
so by the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, ex-
periences a decline from 2010 to 2013, although at high 
levels. By contrast, estimates for Bulgaria suggest a jump, 
although at a comparatively low level. The direction of 
changes over time and the absolute numbers are broadly 
similar to Adalet McGowan et al.[1], although the estimates 
in absolute numbers differ for Sweden. Our estimates are 
slightly lower than Adalet McGowan et al.[1]; slovenia 
(slightly higher); Belgium (much lower); France (much 
higher); and Italy (highest share of sunk capital in Adalet 
McGowan et al.[1], but ranked only average here). Annex 
C reports more details on the differences between esti-
mates; these could facilitate reconciliation of differences 
in results, although such reconciliation is beyond the 
scope of the present report.
Figure 2. Zombie firms incidence by country -- Number 
of zombie firms as of total firms
Notes: The share of zombie firms by country in 2013, identified 
by bars and calculated as the number of zombie firms over total 
number of firms. Change in percentage points of zombie shares 
between 2010 and 2013 shown as crosses, diamonds and trian-
gles, for zombie firms A, B and C, respectively. Note that data 
limitations do not allow us to show triangles for Germany and 
Ireland.
The results for the second measure are shown in Fig-
ure 3. As background, this measure is obtained as the 
total amount of funding allocated to zombie firms which 
thus cannot be allocated to other firms. Following Adalet 
McGowan et al.[1], it is referred to as sunk capital and ob-
tained by using the book value of fixed assets as reported 
in Orbis. Unlike Adalet McGowan et al.[1] though, we did 
not calculate the real stock of capital. ② The figure high-
lights substantial discrepancies across countries. More 
than a fourth of Greek corporate capital is estimated to 
be held by zombie firms, while zombie firms in Slova-
kia, Czech Republic, and Finland hold less than 5% sunk 
capital. Countries that were most affected by the Europe-
an crisis are not necessarily those displaying the largest 
share. For instance, Belgium, France and Great Britain 
have greater or similar shares of sunk capital as do Italy 
and Portugal. In general, new entrants to the European 
Union (e.g., Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania 
and Poland) are less affected by the issue of sunk capital 
than other EU members. While Belgium, Bulgaria and 
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Germany are estimated to have a low number of zombie 
firms, they rank less favourably in terms of the share of 
sunk capital. By contrast, the sunk capital share is low in 
Ireland, but the number of zombie firms relatively high. 
Comparing these estimates with Adalet McGowan et al.[1], 
the overall magnitudes are fairly similar, with estimates 
ranging from somewhat less than 5% to 20%. Considering 
country-specific estimates, results are similar for Spain, 
Belgium and Portugal. Higher results are obtained here for 
Great Britain (about 12 instead of 7), France (13 instead 
of 8). Lower results are obtained for Italy (13 instead of 
20), Austria (7 instead of 9) Finland (4 instead of 7).
Figure 3. Zombie firms incidence by country – Ratio of 
fixed assets held by zombies to total assets.
Notes: Estimates of the share of sunk capital in 2013. sunk cap-
ital is the share of capital held by zombie firms as of fixed assets 
held by all firms in the respective country.
4.3 effects of Zombie Firms on Non-zombie Firms
The incidence of zombie firms, discussed in the previ-
ous section, may affect the development of non-zombie 
firms in the same economy or sector. At least three po-
tential channels for such spill-overs can be distinguished. 
First, by "absorbing" bank capital at prices unfairly low 
given their riskiness, zombie firms add to pressures fac-
ing healthy non-zombie firms to obtain bank financing. 
Healthy non-zombies might be forced to contract loans at 
higher rates, and at one point the rates might be so high 
that the firms will decide to rely on internal financing 
(i.e., reduce dividends and reinvest earnings) as opposed 
to external financing, which might penalize overall in-
vestment and subsequently growth. Second, zombie firms 
compete with non-zombie firms on product markets. Giv-
en their low profitability and financially weak situation, 
zombie firms may increase risk in an attempt to gamble 
for redemption [5]. Any financial subsidies that zombie 
firms receive from banks allows the former to exert such 
product market competitive pressure on healthy firms for 
longer periods than would have otherwise been feasible. 
In a way, unhealthy zombie firms keep a share of prod-
ucts sales away from healthy non-zombie firms, which 
would need to reduce prices to recuperate "lost" product 
sales. Third, a similar mechanism might operate in labour 
markets – zombie firms increase salaries so as to retain 
workforce, and are thus "crowding out" the labour market 
for healthy zombie firms. As a result of the various types 
of competitive pressures, healthy non-zombie firms face 
a lower growth potential. In response to this situation, 
healthy non-zombie firms will renew only relative more 
productive incumbent projects, which will have the effect 
that the latter gradually increase their overall productivity.
there is evidence that these various conceptual consider-
ations are reflected in the data. For example, Caballero et 
al. (2008) and Adalet McGowan et al.[1,5] find that the inci-
dence of zombie firms penalizes the growth of non-zom-
bie firms. In fact, they find that the share of assets (total 
assets or fixed assets) held by zombie firms in a sector af-
fects the growth in employment and investment of healthy 
zombie firms in that sector. there is also evidence that 
non-zombie firms become more productive in response.
To investigate the effects of the incidence of zombie firms 
on the performance of non-zombie firms, we estimate the 
following empirical model of firm performance:
Firm performancei,y = non-zombiei,y + non-zombiei,y x 
zombie sharec,y + Agei,y + Sizei,y + Industry-year-country 
fixed effects (1)
The firm performance model (1) is estimated using all 
firms in our sample, i.e. zombies and non-zombies, and 
its specification follows Adalet McGowan et al.[1]. the 
dependent variable is one of four indicators capturing the 
performance of firm i in year y. 
a. The first performance indicator is Ln(I/K)I,y, the ratio 
of capital stock investment of the firm between year t-1 
and t; it is equal to ln[FAt/FAt-1] = ln(FAt)-ln(FAt-1).
b. The second indicator is Δ ln(Employment)i,y, the 
log difference in the number of employees; it measures 
the employment growth of the firm. An alternative is to 
use growth of sales, but we consider that the number of 
employees is preferable as it is less volatile than financial 
indicators such as sales. Unfortunately, the number of 
employees is reported by fewer firms in the Orbis dataset 
than sales, implying that we lose some observations. 
c. The third indicator is Labour productivity, here mea-
sured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of the value 
added by the firm compared to the number of its employ-
ees. In particular, we proxy value added by adding profits 
(EBIT = after depreciation, before interest and tax pay-
ments) to the cost of salaries. This estimate is frequently 
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used in firm-specific productivity analysis and avoids the 
issue of limited availability of data on added value per 
firm in Orbis. 
d. The fourth indicator is MFP*, an estimate of the 
multifactor productivity gains of the firm. We estimate a 
cobb-Douglas productivity function of added value deter-
mined by the total fixed assets and the number of employ-
ees. the estimated model of the production function is 
0.9*Labour + 0.2*Capital. The residuals provide with the 
productivity gain of each firm.
Explanatory variables are non-zombiei,y, a dummy that 
takes the value one if firm i is a zombie firm in year y, us-
ing alternatively the three zombie-firm definitions; zombie 
sharec,y, the share of total capital in sector c and country 
y held by zombie firms; non-zombiei,y x zombie sharec,y, 
an interaction variable between non-zombiei,y and zombie 
sharec,y; age, the age of the firm which equals the differ-
ence between the year of report and the year of incorpora-
tion; size, the number of employees. We added interacted 
industry-year-country fixed effects, where industry is the 
firm's two digits NACE Rev. 2 code. All variables are de-
fined in Annex A. 
the analysis focuses on the variables non-zombiei,y 
and non-zombiei,y X zombie sharec,y. the former captures 
the difference between non-zombie and zombie firms. 
the latter captures the effects of the share of zombies on 
non-zombie firms.
4.3.1 effects of Zombie Firms on investment and 
Growth of Non-zombie Firms
We first look at the investment and growth of non-zombie 
firms. The results of the estimates are reported in Table 2
in three panels, which take into account the three defini-
tions of zombie. We find that non-zombie firms invest and
grow more than zombie firms at high significance stan-
dards, regardless of the definition of zombies we consider.
Considering zombie B definition, a firm switching from
zombie to non-zombie would gain 0.072/0.469 = 15.4%
of the standard deviation in terms of ln(I/K).
The growth of non-zombies is negatively affected by
the existence of zombie firms in their respective countries
and sectors, and significantly so at the 1% level. The eco-
nomic significance is also high; considering the zombie
B definition, a non-zombie firm that would switch from
an environment with no zombies to one entirely crowded
by zombie firms would lose 0.114/0.469 = 24.3% stan-
dard deviation of ln(I/K). As a thought experiment for
the most extreme case, non-zombie firms switching from
the most extreme sunk capital environment of 27.8% in
Greece (definition B) to the lowest sunk capital of 2.7%
in Czech republic, would increase ln(I/K) by (27.8%-
2.7%)*.114=0.0286 more than if the switch happened to
a zombie. This increase represents 6.10% of the standard
deviation increase in investment. Thus, the growth of
non-zombies is substantially affected by the existence of
zombies in their respective countries.
The significance of the impact on employment growth
varies according of the zombie definition, but is negative
in all instances. Considering zombie A definition, the
share of zombies bears negative effects on non-zombies at
one standard level. The economic significance is also high
yet lower than the effects on capital growth; switching
Table 2. Effects of incidence of zombie firms on growth of non-zombie firms
Zombie A Zombie b Zombie c
ln[I/K] Δln(Employ) ln[I/K] Δln(Employ) ln[I/K] Δln(Employ)
Non-zombie firm 0.089*** 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.056*** 0.068*** 0.052***
 [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0023] [0.0017] [0.0025] [0.0020]
Non-zombie firm -0.119*** -0.036*** -0.114*** -0.019 -0.138*** -0.03
X zombie firm share [0.0120] [0.0095] [0.0138] [0.0117] [0.0234] [0.0196]
Mean 0.017 0.049 0.017 0.049 0.017 0.049
standard deviation 0.469 0.386 0.469 0.386 0.469 0.386
Observations 5,733,207 5,977,604 5,733,207 5,977,604 5,733,207 5,977,604
R-squared 0.019 0.052 0.019 0.052 0.019 0.051
Notes: Estimates of Model (1) of firm performance. Zombie A defines zombies as any firm with coverage ratio less than one in three
consecutive years. Zombie B restricts zombie A definition to ten years or older firms. Zombie C restricts zombie B definition to coverage
ratio less than one in five consecutive years (see Annex A). The definitions of the variables are reported in Annex B. All specifications
control for firm age and size categories, and industry-year-country fixed effects. The last line reports the mean and standard deviation (in
square brackets) of the dependent variables. ***, **,* respectively indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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from zombie free sector to a fully crowded zombie sector 
implies a loss in standard deviation of -0.036/0.386=-
9.3%. Considering zombie B and C definitions, losses are 
4.9% and 7.8% respectively, but are insignificant at the 
10% level.
4.3.2 effects of Zombie Firms on Labour and Capital 
Productivity of Non-zombie Firms
We next look at the effects of zombie firms on the produc-
tivity of non-zombie firms. We estimate Model (1) of firm 
performance and substitute the performance dependent 
variables with productivity measures. Similar to Caballero 
et al. and Adalet McGowan et al.[1,5], we use a proxy of 
multi-factor productivity MFP. We further investigate the 
effect on productivity by alternatively considering a proxy 
for labour productivity, which we construct by scaling the 
added value by the number of employees, both variables 
being available in Orbis. Again, the headers zombie A, B, 
and C columns indicate that we alternatively used zombie 
A, B, and C definitions.
As expected, and regardless of the specific definition of 
zombies, healthy non-zombie firms display higher produc-
tivity than zombie firms, whichever productivity measure 
we use. Moreover, consistently with Caballero et al. (2008) 
and Adalet McGowan et al.[1,5], non-zombie firms tend 
to have a higher labour productivity than zombie firms, 
but the effects of the incidence of zombies on the labour 
productivity of non-zombies are negative and significant 
at the 1% level, regardless of the definition of zombies 
considered. Besides, the effect of the incidence of zom-
bie firms on the MFP of non-zombie firms is found to be 
positive, similar to earlier studies. That said, the results 
are only strongly significant when considering the most 
restrictive zombie company definition, requiring firms to 
be unprofitable for at least five consecutive years. 
the difference in results obtained here for labour pro-
ductivity on the one hand and multi-factor productivity on 
the other might be explained by the use of book value of 
capital (fixed assets) to calculate multi-factor productivity 
rather than real capital. An alternative plausible explana-
tion is the observation that it takes firms more time to ad-
just labour productivity than multi-factor productivity. the 
immediate effects on productivity of non-zombie firms of 
a greater incidence of zombie firm are negative but tends 
to be more positive once the response of non-zombie 
firms to the situation has more fully played out. Caballe-
ro et al.[5] focus on the ability of firms to implement new 
and more productive projects. these projects are likely 
to require the substitution of fixed assets, which is likely 
to be easier than substituting labour force. Therefore, all-
in-all firms may be more productive, but other factors of 
productivity make up for the drop in labour productivity.
4.3.3 effects of incidence of Zombie Firms on Perfor-
mance of Young Non-zombie Firms
Finally, we investigate to what extent the effects on 
growth and productivity differ for young non-zombie 
firms as opposed to non-zombie firms of any age. Cabal-
lero et al.[5] argue that new entrants are most affected by 
the presence of zombies in their market. As a result of the 
more intense competition, new entrants would need to be 
propose more productive project than those pursued by 
Table 3. Effects of incidence of zombie firms on productivity of non-zombie firms
Zombie A Zombie b Zombie c
MFP Labour MFP Labour MFP Labour
Non-zombie firm 0.107*** 0.046*** 0.109*** 0.043*** 0.122*** 0.043***
 [0.0049] [0.0043] [0.0055] [0.0051] [0.0055] [0.0051]
Non-zombie firm 0.055* -0.260*** 0.026 -0.529*** 0.168*** -0.529***
X zombie firm share [0.0307] [0.0243] [0.0444] [0.0512] [0.0633] [0.0512]
Mean 9.079 9.951 9.079 9.951 9.079 9.951
standard deviation 0.881 0.940 0.881 0.940 0.881 0.940
Observations 4,663,474 4,758,161 4,663,474 4,758,161 4,663,474 4,758,161
R-squared 0.669 0.739 0.669 0.739 0.668 0.739
Notes: Estimates of Model (1) of firm performance. Zombie A defines zombies as any firm with coverage ratio less than one in three 
consecutive years. Zombie B restricts zombie A definition to ten years or older firms. Zombie C restricts zombie B definition to coverage 
ratio less than one in five consecutive years (see Annex A). The definitions of the variables are reported in Annex B. All specifications 
control for firm age and size categories, and industry-year-country fixed effects. The last line reports the mean and standard deviation (in 
square brackets) of the dependent variables. ***, **, * respectively indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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incumbents. Therefore, new entrants are more severely 
impacted by the share of funds sunk in zombie firms. In 
order to investigate the hypothesis, we modify model (1) 
to obtain Model (2) that controls for young firms:
Firm performancei,y = Non-zombiei,y + Non-zombiei,y x 
youngi,y + Non-zombiei,y x zombie sharec,y + Non-zombiei,y 
x zombie sharec,y x youngi,y+ Agei,y + Sizei,y + Indus-
try-year-country fixed effects (2)
In particular, compared to Model (1), we add the dum-
my variable youngi,y that indicates that firm i is young – i.e., 
six years or younger – in year y. We also introduce two in-
teraction variables: non-zombiei,y x youngi,y, a dummy that 
captures young non-zombie firms; non-zombiei,y x zombie 
sharec,y x youngi,y, non-zombie young firms interacted with 
the share of zombie firms in their respective industries 
(in a specific country). The estimates of Model (2) are 
reported in Table 4 (growth) and Table 5 (productivity). 
Specifically, we are interested in the impact of the share 
of zombie firms in a sector on the growth and productiv-
ity of young non-zombie firms. Notice that considering 
zombie B and C definitions imply that all young firms are 
non-zombies, while zombie company definition allows 
young firms to be either zombies or non-zombies (see also 
Table A2 in Annex A).
We find evidence that non-zombie young firms grow 
faster than firms on average, at 1% significance levels, 
regardless of the zombie definition we use. Interestingly, 
they add on growth compared to non-young (non-zombie) 
firms; young non-zombie firms grow about twice as fast as 
old non-zombie firms, as reflected in the observation that 
the estimated coefficient of the variable "non-zombie firm 
* young firm" in Table 4 is also positive and about the same 
size as that of "non-zombie firm". The signs and magnitudes 
of the estimated coefficients are similar to [1], Table A5. 
The impact of the share of zombie firms in any sector 
on the performance of non-zombie firms in that sector is 
negative overall. Non-zombie firms are "penalized" in 
their growth in fixed assets investment, although not in 
terms of employment growth. Young non-zombie firms 
are negatively affected by the presence of zombie firms in 
their sector in terms of employment growth, regardless of 
the type of zombie company definition chosen. by con-
trast, no significant adverse effect is identified for these 
firms in terms of their investment. Similarly, no signifi-
cant adverse effects are identified on the growth in terms 
of employment of non-zombie firms of any age, and one 
specification even suggests a significant positive effect. 
These results differ from Adalet McGowan et al.[1]. 
Table 5 shows the effects of the share of (zombie firm) 
sunk cost on productivity of young non-zombie firms. 
Young non-zombie firms have higher productivity, regard-
less of the zombie definition and productivity indicator 
(labour or asset) chosen. The results are significant at 
the 1% level. The estimates of the effects of the share of 
zombie firms follows the same pattern as in the estimates 
of model (1), i.e., MFP* is positively affected at the 1% 
significance level (except in zombie B definition model), 
while labour productivity is negatively affected. Young 
Table 4. Effects of zombie firms incidence on growth of young non-zombie firms
Zombie A Zombie b Zombie c
ln[I/K] Δln(Employ) ln[I/K] Δln(Employ) ln[I/K] Δln(Employ)
Non-zombie firm 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.046*** 0.059*** 0.041***
 [0.0026] [0.0019] [0.0024] [0.0018] [0.0026] [0.0021]
Non-zombie firm X young firm 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.060*** 0.083*** 0.061*** 0.081***
[0.0022] [0.0033] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0019] [0.0027]
Non-zombie firm -0.113*** -0.012 -0.107*** 0.011 -0.115*** 0.042**
X zombie firm share [0.0121] [0.0098] [0.0139] [0.0117] [0.0237] [0.0214]
Non zombie firm X 0.037*** -0.038* 0 -0.092*** -0.024 -0.148***
young firm X zombie firm share [0.0140] [0.0197] [0.0170] [0.0250] [0.0260] [0.0369]
Mean 0.033 0.070 0.033 0.070 0.033 0.070
standard deviation 0.492 0.441 0.492 0.441 0.492 0.441
Observations 6,028,707 6,286,636 6,028,707 6,286,636 6,028,707 6,286,636
R-squared 0.029 0.079 0.028 0.078 0.028 0.078
Notes: Estimates of model (2) controlling for young firms. Young is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is six years 
or younger. Variables are defined in Annex A. ***, **, * respectively indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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non-zombie firms are not much affected by the zombie 
firm share, at least not at standard levels of significance 
(with the exception of the effect on MFP* considering the 
zombie C definition).
4.4 Persistence of "Zombie Status"
the incidence of zombie firms may be an undesirable 
effect of the incentives that banking regulation creates on 
the part of banks. Faced with the alternative of restructur-
ing or extending a loan, a bank may choose to refinance 
zombie firms rather than restructuring their loans because 
the latter would reveal substantial losses on existing loans, 
which would be bad news for shareholders. If the bank's 
capital is already close to its regulatory threshold, then a 
large-scale restructuring of its loans might trigger the need 
for costly recapitalization, which would dilute the value of 
existing shareholders. there is in fact evidence that more 
weakly capitalised banks are more forbearing to their 
creditors than better capitalised banks are caballero et al. 
and Acharya et al.[5,6]. Hence, it is possible that "zombie 
banks make zombie firms" [10].
One possibility is that bank forbearance is an optimal 
response by the bank to what will eventually turn out 
to be temporary pressure on corporate operating profits. 
For example, banks may support distressed firms as part 
of considerations regarding the longer-term benefits of 
the relationship between bank and borrower (e.g. so-
called hausbank relationship). It is feasible that banks 
hold additional "private" information about their existing 
customers, e.g., debt payments records, existing projects, 
checking accounts, existing suppliers and customers, 
which enables them to assess the creditworthiness of the 
borrower with more precision than any outsider. Under 
those circumstances, banks can effectively provide their 
existing customers with liquidity insurance[11].
To see to what extent there might be evidence for such 
effects, we investigate what are the odds that a zombie 
firm remains a zombie in the next two years, or alterna-
tively, becomes "healthy" again. We refer to "successful" 
zombies as those firms that are classified as zombies in 
2010 or 2013 but that report a coverage ratio above one in 
the next two years, i.e. making profits again after an ex-
tended period without profits. 
We compute the share of successful zombies by age 
and size category considering each of the three zombie 
definitions. The results are reported in Figure 4; Panel A 
reports success rates by age category, while Panel B re-
ports success rates by size category. red part of the bars 
represents the share of successful zombie firms in the next 
two years. All numbers are reported in Annex D.
We find that the share of successful zombie firms is 
9.73% on average across all categories, varying from 5.47% 
(zombie C definition, 41+ category) to 11.96% (zombie A 
definition, 50-99 employee firm category). In other words, 
about 90% of zombie firms remain zombies in the next two 
years, or exit from the market and our sample. 
Patterns regarding the likelihood of success as a func-
tion of firm size are hard to detect. Zombie A definition 
Table 5. Effects of zombie firms on productivity of young non-zombie firms
Zombie A Zombie b Zombie c
Labour MFP Labour MFP Labour MFP
Non-zombie firm 0.029*** 0.094*** 0.062*** 0.115*** 0.049*** 0.131***
 [0.0043] [0.0050] [0.0043] [0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0057]
Non-zombie firm X young firm 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.041***
[0.0041] [0.0039] [0.0040] [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0032]
Non-zombie firm -0.222*** 0.086*** -0.281*** 0.056 -0.499*** 0.214***
 X zombie firm share [0.0244] [0.0307] [0.0298] [0.0449] [0.0505] [0.0641]
Non zombie firm X young firm -0.021 0.036 -0.025 0.034 -0.041 0.069*
 X zombie share [0.0222] [0.0239] [0.0281] [0.0309] [0.0422] [0.0396]
Mean 9.900 9.055 9.900 9.055 9.900 9.055
standard deviation 0.981 0.901 0.981 0.901 0.981 0.901
Observations 5,205,765 5,064,025 5,205,765 5,064,025 5,205,765 5,064,025
R-squared 0.734 0.658 0.734 0.658 0.734 0.658
Notes: Estimates of model [2] controlling for young firms. Young is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is six years 
or younger. Variables are defined in Annex A. ***, **, * respectively indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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implies an inverse U-shape, with large firms 250+ em-
ployee firms having the lowest rate of success (10.46%),
while zombie B and C definitions suggest an upward trend
with respect to size (11.5% zombie B, 8.71% zombie C).
By contrast, firm age correlates negatively with the suc-
cess rate. Zombie A definition shows that the success rate
falls from 10.29% for firms aged 2-5 years to 8.71% for
firms aged 41+; the rate is thus 15.4% lower. Considering
zombie B and C definitions, estimates drop from 10.35%
and 7.80%to 8.71% and 5.47%, respectively (thus equiva-
lent to declines by 15.9% and 29.9%, respectively). Older
companies are thus particularly likely to remain zombies
once they enter such status.
   One question is what role policy intervention might 
play in this context③. For example, numerous financial 
support arrangements exist for firms with up to 250 
employees and, in principle, the availability of such 
support pro-grammes might explain why some firms 
can continue to operate even if they fail to generate 
profits for extended periods of time. One way to look 
at this issue is to see whether there is a break in the 
series of the cumulative incidence of zombie company 
rate around the threshold of 250 employees, e.g. to 
detect whether there are more zombie companies among 
companies that are just below that threshold than there 
are among companies that are just above that threshold 
and thus do not qualify for any financial support.
Another issue that could be addressed in future work is
that of the incidence of zombie firms across different sec-
tors. caballero et al.[5] argue that the less a sector is subject
to international competition the larger the share of zombie
firms, given that banks tend to find it more difficult to
subsidize firms in sectors characterized by tight interna-
tional competition. the authors find that manufacturing
is the sector that is most subject to international compe-
tition, and construction the least. In fact, it turns out that
manufacturing displays the lowest share of zombie firms
in Japan, while construction the largest. Figure 5 reports
the share of zombies by sector in 2013 in our sample. It
shows that while the construction sector is characterized
by above-average rates of incidence of zombie firms, the
relative incidence of zombie firms is even higher in the
manufacturing sector. This result contrasts with the esti-
mates in caballero et al.[5].
Figure 5. Incidence of zombie firms by sector
Notes: Zombie company incidence by sectors in 2013, full sample.
5. Conclusions
The report identifies the incidence of zombie firms across 
European countries and the effects of such incidence on 
the asset growth, employment growth and productivity 
of non-zombie firms. Using the example of Japan, Peek 
and Rosenberg (2005) and Caballero et al.[4,5], each using 
different definitions of zombie firms, find that the larger 
Panel A: share by age
Panel b: share by number of employees
Figure 4. Zombie status persistence
Notes: Share of successful zombies, defined as zombie firms 
identified as such in 2010 but that have generated positive profits
in the subsequent two years. We consider the three zombie A,
B, and C definitions, and distinguish firms by age (Panel A) and
employee size category (Panel B). The bar represents the share
of zombies in 2010 (left axis), with the red (blue) colour part of
the bar representing the successful (unsuccessful) zombies. 
Cir-cles represent the share of successful zombies (right axis).
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the share of zombies in a sector, the lower the growth and 
investment decisions of non-zombies, and the larger the 
productivity of the latter. Adalet McGowan et al.[1] using 
yet another definition of zombie firms, identify similar 
results for a sample of twelve European countries and 
Korea. We extend the analysis of Adalet McGowan et al.[1] 
and include additional European countries and consider 
three different zombie firm definitions to ensure robust-
ness of estimation results. We confirm that the larger the 
share of zombie firms in a country the lower the growth of 
non-zombie firms in that country, and the larger tends to 
be the productivity of the latter. Young non-zombie firms 
are most affected by such zombie "congestion" effects. In 
addition, we find that zombie firms are spreading in Eu-
rope. Against this background, the results of the present 
report suggest that one should indeed fear the spread of 
zombie firms in Europe.
the limits of the present analysis need to be recognised. 
Data coverage by Orbis is uneven across years and coun-
tries and sample changes cannot be clearly attributed to exit 
and entry of firms from and to the market, but often reflects 
artefacts of the way data is reported and collected. Another 
limitation is that it is not clear what an appropriate share 
of zombie companies for an economy might be, although 
a priori, lower shares would appear to be preferable than 
higher shares. But what might be a natural level of zombie 
companies and how does that level vary as a function of the 
conjunctural environment? It should be noted that the zom-
bie companies identified here do not ultimately fail with 
certainty. In fact, our results suggest that especially young 
and small firms might ultimately (or again) achieve profit-
ability. such cases can be seen as evidence of the desirable 
effects of so-called Hausbank relationships between banks 
and their customers, whereby banks provide financing 
through difficult periods when its borrowers have low or no 
firm operating profits before they ultimately return to prof-
itability. Obviously, to the extent that they never become 
healthy again and are kept alive artificially through forbear-
ance on the part of banks or through subsidies provided 
through public financial support programmes, resources are 
inefficiently trapped among zombie firms. Follow-up work 
could investigate under what circumstances distorted incen-
tives on the parts of banks and publicly supported financial 
support programmes are contributing to the incidence and 
spread of zombie firms. 
Foot Note: 
① Authors use short-term debt (less than a year), long-term 
debt (more than a year), outstanding bond and commercial 
papers. They relate financial expenses of the firm (includ-
ing interest payments and fee payments) to the estimated 
amounts. the number is compared with the equivalent
lowest market rate the firm should pay controlling for ma-
turities and bond amounts.
② Selected NACE Rev. 2 sectors (code in brackets) are:
Manufacturing (10-33); Electricity and Water supply ser-
vices (35-39); Construction (40-43); Wholesale and retail
services (45-47); Transportation (49-53); Accommodation
and Food services (55-56); Information and Communi-
cation services (58-63); Real estate services (68); Profes-
sional Services (77-83).
③ the sample chosen by [1] consists of the thirteen OEcD
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, It-
aly, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, South Korea,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Compared with [1], we
exclude South Korea (non-EU member) and Luxembourg,
and add Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.
④ Missing interest payments are substituted by financial
expenses. Financial expenses typically include interest
payments plus fees on loans.
⑤ the real stock of capital is calculated using the Perpetual
Inventory Method: for each firm the deflated values of
past deprecations and changes in fixed assets are added
up. This allows to compare the value of fixed assets ac-
quired in say, 2005, with new fixed assets purchased in
2013. Fixed assets deflation factors are sector and country
specific. Similar to [1], we removed outliers defined as ob-
servations for fixed assets that are equivalent to 100 times
the 99th percentile value.
⑥ This question was raised plainly by an OECD Secretar-
iat presentation (which drew on collaborative work on
financial support programmes for SMEs undertaken in
collaboration with the EC JRC) at a meeting of the OECD
Committee on Financial Markets in October 2016. The
presentation made explicit reference to the preliminary
report produced by [1] and, subsequently, the latter authors
kindly agreed to present their findings at the EC JRC. The
question regarding the potential role of policy intervention
remains relevant. Another report prepared by the OEcD
Secretariat in collaboration with the JRC ([12]) suggests that
the potential economic costs of such interventions (which
would include artificially keeping alive zombie firms
through subsidised credit) are often not considered as part
of performance assessments of publicly supported credit
guarantee programmes, owing in particular to the lack of
data that would allow a rigorous analysis including the
construction of a proper counterfactual.
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Annex A – Alternative definitions considered for zom-
bie firms
Annex table A1 presents the three zombie definitions.
The first one (zombie A) defines zombies as firms with
a coverage ratio below one in three consecutive years,
regardless of age. Coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of
EBIT – earnings before interest and taxes, after deprecia-
tion – to interest payments. The second definition (zombie
B) defines zombies as firms that are ten years or older and
have a coverage ratio below one for three consecutive
years. The third definition (zombie C) defines as zombies
those firms that are ten years or older and have a coverage
ratio below one for five consecutive years.
Table A1. Zombie firm definitions
Age restriction Coverage ratio ≤ 1
Zombie A None At least 3 consecutive years
Zombie b ≥10 years At least 3 consecutive years
Zombie c ≥10 years At least 5 consecutive years
Notes: Age is the difference between year of report and year of
incorporation. coverage ratio is the ratio of profits to interest
payments; earnings are earnings after depreciation, and before
interest and tax payments (EBIT). We substitute interest pay-
ments with financial expenses whenever missing.
Table A2 shows what the definitions imply in terms
of estimates of zombie and non-zombie firms across dif-
ferent age groups. Most notably, under zombie B and C
definitions, all firms younger than 10 years are considered
non-zombies.
Table A2. Firm age and zombie firm definitions
3 years < age ≤ 6 years 7 years ≤ age ≤ 9 years 10 years ≤ age
Zombie Non-zombie Zombie Non-zombie Zombie Non-zombie
Zombie A X X X X X X
Zombie b X X X X
Zombie c X X X X
Notes: This table reports the three definitions of zombies that we use, and whether it may be classified or not as a zombie and
non-zombie in function of age. An X denotes that estimates for the respective category of firms indicated as column headers are avail-
able according to the definition shown as the row headers.
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Annex B – Definitions of variables
This annex provides the definitions of the variables used, 
which are obtained from Orbis (the Moody's Bureau van 
Dijk Orbis dataset of firm-level financial statements).
Table B1. Definitions of the variables used
Non-zombie
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is not a zombie company. A company is classified as a 
zombie company in a year if its "coverage ratio = earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by in-
terest payments" is below one in the previous three years. Zombie companies are ten years or older, unless 
otherwise specified.
Zombie share Share of fixed assets held by zombie firms at country and sector 2-digit NACE rev 2 level.
ln(I/K) Investment ratio; equals the difference in the natural logarithm of total fixed assets between two years.
Δ ln(Employment)




Labour productivity equals the natural logarithm of the ratio of the sum of profits (EBIT) and wage-cost to 
employment.
MFP*
Multifactor productivity; equals residuals ε from the OLS estimate of the Cobb-Douglas function ln(Profit 
+ Wage Cost) = - α * ln(Fixed assets) - β * ln(employees) + ε.
where the equation includes country and year fixed effects. Profit is operational profit EBIT. Wage Cost is 
cost of employees. Fixed assets are total fixed assets (including tangible and intangible assets).We obtain α= 
0.9, and β = 0.2. We use these coefficients to predict MFP.
Age Number of years since year of incorporation.
Young Dummy variables that takes the value one if the firm is six years or younger.
Ln(Employment) Natural logarithm of the number of employees.
Industry Two-digit industry NACE rev 2. Classification code.
Annex C – Additional robustness test
As an additional robustness test and to allow a compar-
ison of our results with those reported by [1], this annex 
reports the results using a sample of firms that is as close 
as possible to the one considered by [1]. the sample is 
thus reduced to 11 countries, which are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (note that [1] also 
include Luxembourg and South Korea for which we un-
fortunately do not have data). The analysis is restricted to 
the zombie-firm definition considered by [1], namely, firms 
that are ten years or older and report three consecutive 
years with coverage less than one (referred to as zombie B 
definition in the main text).
As regards the effects of the incidence of zombie firms 
on non-zombie firms, the signs and magnitudes of esti-
mates are similar to [1] for the investment model. results 
are less comparable for the employment model. While 
the estimated coefficient for non-zombie coefficient is 
positive in our regressions, as it is in [1], the magnitude of 
our estimates is only about half that of [1] (which is 7%). 
Moreover, our results do not suggest a significant effect 
(Table C 2). Although we use a simple as opposed to a more 
elaborate proxy for multi-factor productivity unlike [1], our 
results are close to the latter for the productivity models. 
Figure C 1. Incidence of zombie firms in sub-sample
Notes: Figure is similar to Figure 3, but considers only the set 
of countries considered in [1].
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Table C1. Number of observations by country and year in sub-sample
Restricted AAM Country Set code 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Austria At 36,611 37,203 37,203
belgium bE 38,643 39,557 40,608 41,481 41,667 41,667
Finland FI 20,784 21,696 22,572 23,385 23,990 24,221
France Fr 189,535 194,889 200,039 204,149 206,600 207,205
Germany DE 308,962 309,313 309,313
Italy It 185,044 194,370 204,112 212,470 216,524 216,524
Portugal Pt 77,256 79,581 81,929 84,137 86,037
slovenia sI 10,846 11,060 11,287 11,501 11,662 11,729
Sweden sE 41,817 43,354 45,114 45,832 45,934 45,934
spain Es 234,837 239,484 244,115 248,119 251,562 252,951
United Kingdom Gb 40,071 41,017 41,886 42,641 43,227 43,415
subtotal 761,577 862,683 889,314 1,257,080 1,271,819 1,276,199
Notes: This table reports the distribution of firms when the sample is restricted to contain only the countries considered by [1] (referred
to as AAM in the table).
Table C2. Effects of zombie firms incidence on performance of non-zombie firms for sub-sample
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ln (I/K) Δ ln(Employ)         Labour productivity MFP
Non-zombie b 0.064*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.064***
[0.0029] [0.0020] [0.0041] [0.0061]
Non-zombie b x zombie b share -0.097*** 0.019 -0.230*** 0.155***
[0.0171] [0.0147] [0.0315] [0.0529]
Firm age and size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year-country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,837,475 2,844,864 2,834,569 2,810,461
R-squared 0.03 0.068 0.455 0.361
Dependent variable:
Mean and [standard deviation] 0.036 [0.452] 0.045 [0.379] 10.251 [0.568] 9.298 [0.574]
Notes: Estimates of Model (1) of firm performance. We restrict the sample to the countries considered in [1] and use zombie B defi-
nition only. Zombie B defines zombies as any firm aged ten years or older and with coverage ratio less than one in three consecutive
years. The definitions of the variables are reported in Annex B. All specifications control for firm age and size categories, and indus-
try-year-country fixed effects. The last line reports the mean and standard deviation (in square brackets) of the dependent variables.
***, **, * respectively indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table C3. Effect of incidence of zombie firms on performance of young non-zombie firms for sub-sample
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ln (I/K) Δln(Employ) Labour productivity MFP
Non-zombie b 0.067*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.067***
[0.0028] [0.0019] [0.0040] [0.0057]
Non-zombie b x young 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.034*** 0.015***
[0.0035] [0.0042] [0.0039] [0.0056]
Non-zombie b x zombie b share -0.108*** 0.011 -0.219*** 0.132***
[0.0173] [0.0131] [0.0299] [0.0487]
Non-zombie b x zombie b share X young 0.109*** 0.089*** -0.067** 0.159***
[0.0251] [0.0323] [0.0281] [0.0489]
Firm age and size controls yes yes yes yes
Industry-year-country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,837,475 2,844,864 2,834,569 2,810,461
R-squared 0.032 0.072 0.456 0.361
Dependent variable
Mean and (standard deviation) 0.036 [0.452] 0.045 [0.379] 10.251 [0.568] 9.298[0.57]
Notes: Estimates of Model (1) of firm performance. We add young, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is 6 years old 
or younger. We restrict the sample to the countries considered in [1] and use zombie B definition only. Zombie B defines zombies as 
any firm aged ten years or older and with coverage ratio less than one in three consecutive years. The definitions of the variables are 
reported in Annex B. All specifications control for firm age and size categories, and industry-year-country fixed effects. The last line 
reports the mean and standard deviation (in square brackets) of the dependent variables. ***, **, * respectively indicates statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Annex D – Persistence of zombie status
The following tables report the figures we used in Figure 
1 and Figure 4. Notice that firms aged less than 10 years 
cannot be identified as zombies under zombie B and zom-
bie C definitions (See Annex A).
Table D1. Zombie firms and "success" rate
Zombie A Zombie b Zombie c
% zombies % success % zombies % success % zombies % success
Number of employees
5-9 4.96 10.58 3.52 10.13 0.95 8.03
10-19 4.43 11.47 3.26 11.40 0.87 8.43
20-49 4.90 11.45 3.85 11.25 1.16 7.85
50-99 5.89 11.96 4.67 11.86 1.48 9.36
100-249 6.50 10.97 5.17 11.25 1.79 8.14
250+ 7.13 10.46 5.75 11.50 2.21 8.71
Firm age in years
2-5 4.65 10.29
6-10 5.18 09.92 1.05 10.35 0.29 7.80
11-20 5.50 10.09 5.50 10.09 1.46 7.61
21-40 6.45 10.02 6.45 10.02 1.95 7.92
41+ 5.96 08.71 5.96 08.71 2.18 5.47
Notes: "Success" is defined as a situation, where a firm identified as a "zombie" either in 2010 or in 2013 and generates profits that 
outweigh interest rate expenses during the subsequent two years. The "success rate" measures the proportion of such successful com-
panies as of all zombie companies in the respective category.
